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BACK TO THE FUTURE WITH
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE: ANALYSIS AND
APPLICATION OF LEE v. WEISMAN
I. INTRODUCTION
To many Oklahomans, there are two significant interests in life:
football and God. In response to the United States Supreme Court's
most recent school prayer decision, Lee v. Weisman,' many Oklahoma
public school districts surprisingly punted pre-game prayers at high
school football games. The Supreme Court held that a prayer offered at a
public high school graduation ceremony violated the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment because students might have been indi-
rectly coerced through peer pressure to participate in the state-sponsored
invocation and benediction.2 Consequently, the Oklahoma Superinten-
dent of Schools warned the local school boards to discontinue pre-game
prayers at football games because of the potential exposure to a lawsuit.
Some communities heeded the advice and punted prayer.3 Others hud-
dled together and elected to continue offering pre-game prayers, hoping
they are not flagged for a violation of the Establishment Clause of the
1. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
2. Id. at 2657.
3. At local high schools, officials announced they would no longer tolerate pre-game prayers.
Local law firms representing several school districts issued memos advising their clients that under
Lee v. Weisman, officials would be exposing the districts to potential lawsuits if the prayers were
continued. Barbara Hoberock, Prayer to be Aired For Schools to Play, TULSA WORLD, Sept. 10,
1992, at Al. However, Sand Springs, a Tulsa suburb, continues to hold traditional pre-game student
led prayers. Id In Owasso, another Tulsa suburb, the football team kneeled while members of the
crowd bowed their heads, continuing a long standing tradition of pre-game prayers. Kelly Kurt,
Silence of the Rams, TULSA TRIu., Sept. 5, 1992, at Al.
The National School Board Association stated that prayer at any school sponsored event is
unconstitutional. Barbara Hoberock, Area State School Systems Prioritize Court Ruling Differently,
TULSA WORLD, Oct. 11, 1992, at D3. Under the advice of a local law firm, the Superintendent for
the Broken Arrow school district issued a written policy statement explaining that "students have
the right not to be subjected to prayers at a graduation exercise, student assembly, or other school-
sponsored event." He further stated that Lee v. Weisman "clearly prohibits prayers at all kinds of
school events .... " To the Point, ARROWPOIrr (Broken Arrow Pub. Sch. Admin. Ctr., Broken
Arrow, Okla.), Sept. 1992.
A spokesman for the ACLU issued a statement threatening legal action against any public
school that continues to offer pre-game prayers. Wayne Greene, ACLU Threatens to Sue Schools
Over Prayers, TULSA WORLD, Sept. 22, 1992, at Al.
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First Amendment.'
The Lee Court's application of the coercion theory is contrary to
school prayer precedent and is not the product of stare decisis. The
court used a novel construction that replaced the historical version of the
coercion analysis with a contemporary psycho-coercion analysis. The
following critique does not suggest that the Court retreat from the coer-
cion analysis employed in previous school prayer cases.' However, use of
the psycho-coercion analysis to find a high school graduation ceremony6
unconstitutional is inherently flawed. This flaw can be traced to the
Court's unwillingness to recognize that the precedent for the coercion
analysis hinged on important facts that were absent in Lee. The Court
failed to recognize that graduating seniors are not young impressionable
children susceptible to peer pressure. Additionally, the state-sponsored
prayer was not part of a daily ritual of religious expression, nor was it
offered in a classroom where teacher-student relationships precipitate the
fear of indoctrination. Accordingly, the decision is inconsistent with
school prayer precedent and, hence, circumvents the Court's policy of
accommodating and validating long-standing religious traditions rooted
in American heritage. Finally, this note maintains that by failing to
overrule Lemon v. Kurtzman, confusion and contradiction in lower court
4. The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or of the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a
redress of grievances." U.S. CONsr. amend. I.
5. In Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), the Supreme Court considered New York's pro-
gram of daily prayer recitation. The prayer was composed by state officials who mandated that it be
"said aloud by each class in the presence of a teacher at the beginning of each school day... .".Id. at
422. The Court struck down this practice, reasoning that this type of government sponsored religion
is precisely what the Establishment Clause was designed to prohibit. Id. at 425. One year later the
Supreme Court again ruled on the constitutionality of government sponsored prayer in the class-
room. In Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), no official composed the prayer;
instead, the school was required to read verses from the Bible. Id. at 205. In addition, participation
in these exercises was voluntary. Id. Nevertheless, since the program's purpose and primary effect
was to aid religion, the Court found that it violated the First Amendment. Id. at 223.
6. The analysis in this paper assumes, as did the Court, that the prayer would be given at a
high school graduation ceremony. Although the original prayer was given at the junior high school
level, the Court failed to distinguish the venues.
The record in this case is sparse in many respects, and we are unfamiliar with any fixed
custom or practice at middle school graduations, referred to by the school district as "pro-
motional exercises." We are not so constrained with reference to high schools, however.
High school graduations are such an integral part of American cultural life that we can
with confidence describe their customary features, confirmed by aspects of the record and
by the parties' representations at oral argument.
Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2653.
Furthermore, the Court noted that since Deborah Weisman was enrolled in Classical High
School and it was evident that an invocation and benediction would be conducted at her high school
graduation, she would have a live and justiciable controversy. Id. at 2654. Thus, the Court's deci-
sion and this article's analysis is premised on the high school graduation.
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rulings are inevitable. In addition, common scenarios are set forth to
illustrate how school districts may appropriately apply the Lee decision.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts
For many years the Providence School Committee permitted princi-
pals to include invocations and benedictions in graduation ceremonies.
7
The clergy delivering these prayers in recent years have included Jewish
rabbis and ministers of various Christian denominations.' Usually, the
high school graduation ceremonies are held off school grounds, while
junior high school promotion ceremonies take place on school
campuses.9
In June 1989, Deborah Weisman graduated from Nathan Bishop
Middle School, a public school in Providence. 10 Rabbi Leslie Gutterman
of the Temple Beth El in Providence delivered the ceremony's invocation
and benediction. 1 Four days before the ceremony, Weisman sought a
temporary restraining order to prevent the invocation and benediction.2
Because the district court lacked sufficient time to consider the claims, it
7. Id. at 2652.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 2653.
10. Id. at 2652.
11. Id. at 2652-53. The invocation was as follows:
God of the Free, Hope of the Brave:
For the legacy of America where diversity is celebrated and the rights of minorities
are protected, we thank You. May these young men and women grow up to enrich it.
For the liberty of America, we thank You. May these new graduates grow up to
guard it.
For the political process of America in which all its citizens may participate, for its
court system where all may seek justice we thank You. May those we honor this morning
always turn to it in trust.
For the destiny of America we thank You. May the graduates of Nathan Bishop
Middle School so live that they might help to share it.
May our aspirations for our country and for these young people, who are our hope for
the future, be richly fulfilled. Amen.
Id. (quoting the Agreed Statement of Facts at 22-23).
The benediction was as follows:
0 God, we are grateful to You for having endowed us with the capacity for learning
which we have celebrated on this joyous commencement.
Happy families give thanks for seeing their children achieve an important milestone.
Send Your blessings upon the teachers and administrators who helped prepare them.
The graduates now need strength and guidance for the future, help them to under-
stand that we are not complete with academic knowledge alone. We must each strive to
fulfill what You require of us all: To do justly, to love mercy, to walk humbly.
We give thanks to You, Lord, for keeping us alive, sustaining us and allowing us to
reach this special, happy occasion. Amen.
Id. at 2653. (quoting the Agreed Statement of Facts at 22-23.).
12. Id. at 2653-54.
3
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denied Weisman's motion.13 Principal Lee provided Rabbi Gutterman
with Guidelines for Civic Occasions and "advised him that his prayers
should be nonsectarian." 14 On June 29, 1989, Weisman and her family
attended the graduation ceremony. 5 Subsequently, Weisman filed an
amended complaint seeking for a permanent injunction barring prayers
at graduation ceremonies. 6
B. The District and Appellate Courts' Decisions
The district court determined that the invocation and benediction
violated the Establishment Clause1 7 because the practice of offering
prayer in public ceremonies impermissibly "advance[d] religion by creat-
ing an identification of school with a deity,"'" and thus, "endorsed reli-
gion in general by authorizing an appeal to a deity in public school
graduation ceremonies."' 19 A majority of the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit affirmed by simply endorsing the district court's opinion.2"
C. The Supreme Court's Decision
In finding the ceremony unconstitutional, the Court made three de-
terminations. First, it found that the state officials directed and con-
trolled a performance of a religious exercise.2 ' The Court explained that
a high school principal who included a prayer in a graduation ceremony,
chose the minister who delivered the prayer, provided the minister with
guidelines, and advised the minister as to the nature of the prayer, effec-
tively composed a state-sponsored prayer.22 Relying on Engel v. Vitale,23
the Lee Court declared that the government should not "compose official
prayers" 24 and, therefore, found that the principal's direction and control
13. Id. at 2654.
14. Id. at 2652.
15. Id. at 2654.
16. Id.
17. Weisman v. Lee, 728 F. Supp. 68, 75 (D.R.I.), aff'd, 908 F.2d 1090 (lst Cir. 1990), aff'd,
112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
18. Id. at 72.
19. Id.
20. Weisman v. Lee, 908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir. 1990), aff'd, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992). Judge
Bownes concurred separately, noting that "[a] graduation ceremony does not need a prayer to solem-
nize it," and concluding that the primary purpose of the prayer was solely religious. Id. at 1095.
Therefore, the practice "offends the First Amendment even if the words of the invocation or benedic-
tion are somehow manipulated so that a deity is not mentioned." Id. at 1097.
21. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2655-56 (1992).
22. Id.
23. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
24. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2656 (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962)). In Engel, the
Court explained that "it is no part of the business of government to compose official prayers for any
[Vol. 28:297
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of the prayer violated the Establishment Clause.2"
As its second determination the Court found that the state man-
dated attendance at the graduation ceremony. The school district argued
that Weisman's attendance at the graduation ceremony was voluntary
and, thus, the state did not mandate participation in the religious invoca-
tion and benediction.26 The school district further asserted that the op-
tion of not attending the event "excuse[d] any inducement."27 However,
the Court rejected this assertion because the argument was an overly for-
malistic interpretation of the term "voluntary."28 The Court explained
that the ceremony was of such importance that voluntary attendance was
not really voluntary.29
As its third determination the Court found that the students may
have been coerced into participating in a state-sponsored religious exer-
cise because the adolescents were susceptible to peer pressure.3 ° The
Court found that a reasonable dissenter of high school age could believe
that standing or remaining silent signified her own participation in or
approval of the group exercise, rather than respect for it.3 1 In support of
this proposition, the Court relied on psychological theories which stress
"the common assumption that adolescents are often susceptible to pres-
sure from their peers towards conformity, and that the influence is
strongest in matters of social convention., 32
The Lee Court also refuted the proposition that Marsh v. Cham-
bers33 would control its decision. Though it conceded there were similar-
ities, the Lee Court determined that there was a significant difference
between a public school forum and a legislative session. 4 The Court,
group of the American people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on by the govern-
ment." Engel, 370 U.S. at 425.
25. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2656.
26. Id. at 2659.
27. Id.
28. Id. It declared that "in our society... high school graduation is one of life's most signifi-
cant occasions.... [A] student is not free to absent herself from the graduation exercise in any real
sense of the term 'voluntary' .... " Id.
29. Id. at 2659-60 ("To say that a student must remain apart from the ceremony... is to risk
compelling conformity in an environment analogous to the classroom setting, where we have said the
risk of compulsion is especially high."
30. Id. at 2659.
31. Id. at 2658.
32. Id. at 2659.
33. 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (holding that prayers at the opening of state legislative sessions are
permissible under the Establishment Clause).
34. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2660.
1992]
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citing Engel v. Vitale"5 and Abington School District v. Schempp,36 ex-
plained that in a public school forum teachers retain a "degree of con-
trol" over the students and the ceremony.37 By contrast, legislators are
not compelled to listen to religious prayers, they are free to enter and
leave the sessions with little comment, and they are adults not young
impressionable children. 38 Hence, legislators have other means of avoid-
ing a state-sponsored prayer. In the graduation ceremony, "the student
was left with no alternative but to submit."39 Thus, the school compelled
Weisman to participate in a religious exercise at an event "of singular
importance" not only to her, but to every student.4°
III. ANALYSIS
Crucial to the Court's decision in Lee was the determination that
students may have been coerced into participation. Justice Kennedy ex-
plained that "the measure of constitutional adjudication is the ability and
willingness to distinguish between real threat and mere shadow."41 In
applying the coercion analysis to Lee, however, the Court demonstrated
its inability to make this distinction.
A. No Coercion
The coercion analysis utilized in Lee appears to be grounded in En-
gel and Schempp. However, as the following analysis will demonstrate,
the Lee Court failed to acknowledge that those cases hinged on impor-
tant facts notably absent in Lee. The Court failed to distinguish graduat-
ing seniors from young impressionable children. The state-sponsored
prayer was not part of a daily ritual of religious expression, nor was it
offered in a classroom where the teacher-student relationship aroused
fear of indoctrination. Therefore, the decision is inconsistent with the
notion of indoctrination maintained in school prayer precedent and cir-
cumvents the Court's policy of accommodating and validating long-
standing religious traditions rooted in American heritage.
35. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
36. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
37. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2660.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 2661.
41. Id. at 2661 (quoting Schempp, 374 U.S. at 308 (Goldberg, J., concurring)).
[Vol. 28:297
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1. Daily Ritual of Religious Expression
A critical question in determining if a state-sponsored prayer is per-
missible should be whether the prayer was offered as a daily ritual of
religious expression. In Engel and Schempp the prayers and Bible read-
ings were offered to the students every day.4 2 By finding the state-spon-
sored prayers impermissible, the Court protected the children from a real
threat of coercion. Unlike Engel and Schempp, the prayer offered in Lee
was offered only once in a graduate's life.
Furthermore, in Engel and Schempp, the Court was concerned not
only with the frequency of the prayers, but also with the degree of stu-
dent involvement. The Engel Court focused on the daily recitation of the
Regent's prayer in the classroom.43 In Schempp, the Bible reading was
"followed immediately by a recital in unison by the pupils of the Lord's
Prayer."'  The record in Lee, however, fails to disclose any encourage-
ment of students, parents, teachers, or family members to recite the
prayer. Therefore, the prayer in Lee should not be considered coercive.
2. Confines of the Classroom
A second critical question in determining if a state-sponsored prayer
is permissible should be whether it was offered in the confines of a class-
room. The analysis in Engel and Schempp dealt specifically with the co-
ercive potential of state-sponsored religious activity conducted within the
confines of the classroom combined with the teacher-student relation-
ship. There, the prayers and Bible readings occurred in the classroom
where the young students did not have their parents present to monitor
the activity. In School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball,45 the Court also
found that the unsupervised teacher-student relationship may breed in-
doctrination.46 Although the Ball Court did not apply a coercion analy-
sis, it did indicate that "teachers participating in the programs may
become involved in intentionally or inadvertently inculcating particular
religious tenets or beliefs."'47 Thus, the Court feared that the teacher-
student relationship would lead to indoctrination.
42. The Regent's Prayer in Engel was "a part of the daily procedures of its public schools...."
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 423 (1962) (emphasis added). In Schempp, the Bible was read "at the
opening of each public school on each school day." Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
205 (1963) (emphasis added) (quoting 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 15-1516 (1960)).
43. Engel, 370 U.S. at 424.
44. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 210 (emphasis added) (quoting Schempp v. Abington Sch. Dist., 201 F.
Supp. 815, 819 (E.D. Pa. 1962)).
45. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
46. Id. at 397; see Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987).
47. Ball, 473 U.S. at 385.
1992]
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The Lee Court distinguished the graduation ceremony from a legis-
lative session because teachers retained a "high degree of control" over
the students.48 Yet, it failed to distinguish a classroom from a graduation
ceremony. At the ceremony, students were not under the sole supervi-
sion of a single teacher; parents and family members were in attendance.
Since the teachers did not retain a "high degree of control," the threat of
indoctrination was absent in Lee.49
3. Young Impressionable Minds
In the past, the Court has been concerned with coercive influences
on young students. In Ball, the Court indicated that the threat of indoc-
trination would be pervasive since the primary school students were "im-
pressionable youngsters."" ° Specifically, the Court feared that young
students could not distinguish between religious and secular customs,
teachings, and principles.51
The Lee Court failed to recognize that the students at the gradua-
tion ceremony were not young and impressionable like the students in
Ball. Graduating seniors are able to distinguish between religious cus-
toms, teachings, and principles. They are less impressionable and less
subject to indoctrination at a high school graduation ceremony than
young children in their formative years. They are mature enough to
choose their religious preferences, thereby alleviating any fear of religious
indoctrination. The assertion that high school seniors are susceptible to
peer pressure and, thus, susceptible to the risks of indoctrination and
government coercion is inconsistent with the Court's own determination
that only young students are susceptible to religious indoctrination.
The Lee Court also failed to consider that a high school graduate
may be a legal adult. A proper application of the coercion analysis pro-
tects children from becoming indoctrinated in religion or religious beliefs
contrary to their own.52 However, the majority of graduating seniors are
adults. They are given the right to vote, are required to register for the
48. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2660.
49. See Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2685 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia explained that:
[O]ur school-prayer cases turn in part on the fact that the classroom is inherently an in-
structional setting, and daily prayer there-where parents are not present to counter "the
students' emulation of teachers as role models and the children's susceptibility to peer
pressure," might be thought to raise special concerns regarding state interference with the
liberty of parents to direct the religious upbringing of their children ....
Id. at 2685 (citation omitted) (quoting Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987)).
50. Ball, 473 U.S. at 385.
51. Id.
52. See supra part III.A.l.
[Vol. 28:297
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draft, and are criminally liable as adults. Therefore, since most gradu-
ates are legal adults, the Court's assertion that they are susceptible to
peer pressure similar to young children is unconvincing.
This is not the first time the Court was needed to distinguish stu-
dents by age and maturity. In holding the Equal Access Act constitu-
tional, the Court found high school students no less mature than college
students." In Tilton v. Richardson,54 the Court found that "college stu-
dents are less impressionable and less susceptible to indoctrination.""5 If
high school students were included in the Board of Education v.
Mergens 56 analysis, then graduating seniors, who are older and more ma-
ture than young students, but equally mature as college students, should
clearly understand the context in which an invocation and benediction is
given. Therefore, there is no threat of indoctrinating high school se-
niors." The Court should not treat legal adults as if they were still
young impressionable children.
Accordingly, the facts in Lee more closely resemble the facts in
Marsh, than Engel or Schempp. In Marsh, Justice Kennedy explained
that since an audience is comprised of adults, they are not coerced to
participate in the prayer and, hence, are not indoctrinated. It follows
that, if the students in Lee were adults, the prayer would have been con-
stitutional. The question turns not on the prayer, but on a factual in-
quiry into the circumstances and the maturity level of the audience.
Since the Lee Court failed to consider the maturity level of the audience,
its decision is fundamentally flawed.
B. Policy
The Lee Court's analysis fails in two respects. First, the original
intent of the coercion analysis embraced the notion that the government
may not compel participation in religious activities by lawful sanction or
threat of penalty. A coercion theory that requires a factual inquiry into
psychological inducements can only lead to arbitrary results because the
finders of fact differ as to what may or may not constitute impermissible
psychological coercion. Second, the underlying theme in past school
53. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 235 (1990) (comparing the maturity of high
school students with students at the state university and finding the maturity level similar with
respect to their ability to understand that speech, no less religious speech, is not coercive).
54. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
55. Id. at 686.
56. 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
57. See Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963, 969-971 (1992).
1992]
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prayer decisions has been the fear of indoctrination, not strict separation
of church and state.
1. Legal Coercion or Psycho-Coercion?
The concept of coercion by threat of penalty is best illustrated in the
Book of Daniel. King Darius of the Medo-Persian empire issued a de-
cree that anyone who prays to any god except the king shall be thrown
into the lion's den. 58 Everyone in the empire except Daniel conformed to
King Darius' religious orthodoxy under the threat of lawful penalty.
The Lee Court's psycho-coercion analysis does not address the
Framers' concern with dictated orthodoxy. They were not concerned
with amorphous psychological coercion, but with "coercion of religious
orthodoxy and of financial support by force of law and threat of pen-
alty."59 The Framers attempted to create a legal structure that would
spoil any governmental attempt to coerce participation in state-spon-
sored religious exercises under the threat of state sanction. 60 For exam-
ple, the Church of England, the official church of the Virginia colony,
required all people to attend church and pay tithes to support the official
Anglican ministers.61 The "ministers were required by law to conform to
the doctrine and rites of the Church of England."'62 In addition, the col-
onists were taxed specifically for funding church buildings.63 Moreover,
dissenters were penalized through an "array of civil disabifities." 6
Vetoing a bill that would have incorporated the Episcopal Church
the official church of the District of Columbia, James Madison objected
explaining that "Congress shall make no law respecting a religious estab-
lishment."65 Madison feared an official state church buttressed by the
state's power to coerce conformity.66 Thus, the Framers designed the
Establishment Clause to prohibit actual coercion, not an ultra-subjective
psycho-coercion.
Other cases have also corroborated this view. In West Virginia
Board of Education v. Barnette,67 the Court held that requiring of public
58. Daniel 6:7.
59. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2683 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
60. Id. (emphasis omitted).
61. Id. (citing L. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 3-4 (1986)).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. (citing L. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 4 (1986)).
65. James Madison, The Civil and Religious Functions of Government, in THE ANNALS OF
AMERICA: 1811, at 287 (1976).
66. Id.
67. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
[Vol. 28:297
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school students to recite the Pledge of Allegiance, under the threat of
expulsion, violated the coercion element inherent in the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment." The threat of expulsion for failure to
recite the Pledge was impermissible government coercion. Additionally,
the Schempp Court found that since students are required by law to at-
tend school, they are coerced not by psychological peer pressure but by
threat of legal sanction.69
The Lee Court has therefore extended the proscriptive arm of the
coercion analysis far beyond that envisioned by Madison or articulated in
Barnette, Engel, and Schempp. Coercion has never included peer pres-
sure. The Court has shifted from only considering governmental sanc-
tions to also considering amorphous psychological peer pressure.
2. Separation or Indoctrination?
Justice Blackmun asserted that the Establishment Clause erected a
wall of separation between church and state.70 He argued that, "[t]he
Amendment's purpose... was to create a complete and permanent sepa-
ration of the spheres of religious activity and civil authority by compre-
hensively forbidding every form of public aid or support for religion."71
Separationists argue that under no circumstances may government spon-
sor religious expression or accommodate religious beliefs. They contend
that those who desire to express personal religious views must do so
outside the public school forum. Yet, the original intent underlying the
Establishment Clause does not embrace such a standard.
Although never expressly articulated in Engel, Schempp, or Lee,
each decision is driven by the fear of indoctrination, not the desire to
erect a strict wall of separation. Pure separation is incompatible with
Establishment Clause jurisprudence; Engel, Schempp, and Lee would not
have been decided as they were if the audience in each scenario had been
composed of adults. Thus, a state-sponsored prayer in the absence of an
impressionable young audience should not be prohibited. It follows that
the court has rejected a strict separation analysis.
The Court prohibits state-sponsored prayers in the public school fo-
rum, not because it requires a strict separation, but rather to protect chil-
dren from the threat of indoctrination. Children are easily compelled to
believe whatever a teacher professes. What the teacher professes may be
68. Id. at 641-42.
69. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963).
70. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2662.
71. Id. at 2662.
1992]
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diametrically opposed to the students' religious values. Since many chil-
dren are schooled in an environment where parental supervision is spo-
radic, society protects children from the possible indoctrinating effect an
unsupervised teacher's beliefs may have on them.
Future controversies should be scrutinized to determine whether the
prayer indoctrinates, not whether the wall of separation has been ever so
slightly breached. Religious exercises or expressions are inevitable; we
are a religious people.72 And we bring diversity to the public forum. The
proposition that we must leave our religious heritage at home is unrealis-
tic and demeaning. In the context of a civic ceremony, the Court should
maintain a coercion analysis to protect susceptible individuals from gov-
ernmental establishment of religion. The coercion analysis must, how-
ever, turn on the danger of indoctrination, not some fabricated notion of
strict separation. If the government action produces a reasonable fear of
indoctrination, then the state-sponsored activity should be prohibited;
otherwise, citizens should be allowed to offer a traditional prayer at a
civic ceremony. A one minute invocation or benediction offered at a
civic ceremony produces neither a reasonable fear of indoctrination nor a
threat of penalty.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
The Court's failure to overrule Lemon v. Kurtzman73 will confuse
lower courts and result in contradictory rulings. The following scenarios
are set forth to illustrate how school districts may appropriately apply
Lee.
A. Ignoring the Lemon Test
In order to survive Lemon every government action must pass a
three prong test. First, every act must have a secular purpose. Second,
its principal or primary effect must neither advance nor inhibit religion.
Finally, it must not foster an excessive governmental entanglement with
religion.74
The Lee Court refused to apply the Lemon test. This refusal will
force lower courts to choose between Lemon and Lee. Consequently,
72. Id. at 2661 ("There will be instances when religious values, religious practices, and reli-
gious persons will have some interaction with the public schools and their students.") (citing Board
of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990)).
73. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
74. Id. at 612-13.
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lower court decisions will likely be outcome determinative and
contradictory.
B. Application of Lee v. Weisman to Related Scenarios.
While many communities wish to continue offering prayers at
school events,75 they should consider the risks. State-sponsored prayers
may cost the school district a substantial amount of money. If schools
insist on taking up the gauntlet and offering prayers, they should do so in
a manner consistent with Lee. In other words, if the prayer is non-state-
sponsored, voluntary, or non-coercive, it should pass constitutional
muster.
76
1. Prayer At Public School Athletic Events
A state-sponsored prayer offered at a public high school football
game should not be prohibited because a crucial element of Lee is absent.
The Lee Cour. found that attendance at the graduation ceremony was
non-voluntary because it was an event of singular importance to the
graduates.77 A football game, however, does not occupy the same level
of importance as a graduation ceremony and is voluntary.
An additional way the school district can side step liability is to
avoid another element of Lee. Namely, prayers should not appear to be
state-sponsored. This can be accomplished by making sure the prayers
are student initiated.78
2. Public School Baccalaureate Services
A baccalaureate service may still be conducted without violating
Lee. To be permissible, the service should be conducted without any
input from the school district, and attendance should not be required.
This approach complies with Lee because it is non-state-sponsored and
voluntary.
3. Public School Eulogies
Schools across the country frequently find themselves coping with
student deaths. Fortunately, they may constitutionally sponsor eulogies.
Since eulogies are not events of singular importance, like graduation cer-
emonies, attendance is voluntary. Therefore, a school-sponsored eulogy
75. See supra note 3.
76. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
77. Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist. 977 F.2d 963, 970-72 (1992).
78. Id.
1992]
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will not violate Lee. 9
4. State University Functions
Prayers given at state college functions are constitutional since they
are not coercive. In Lee, the Court found the prayer coercive because the
impressionable students were susceptible to peer pressure. College stu-
dents, though, are not as susceptible to peer pressure. Since the prayer
would be non-coercive, it should not violate Lee.
V. CONCLUSION
The Court's extension of the coercion analysis to include a psycho-
logical inquiry is a novel, but unworkable, application of precedent. The
school prayer case law developed by the Supreme Court has been based
on the doctrine of legal coercion. By going back to the future and imply-
ing psychological factors to the coercion analysis, the Court has need-
lessly created confusion, inconsistency, and contradiction.
Will K Wright
79. Id
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